In late April, I took part in the Sovereign Tech Europe 2026 conference in Brussels. What I heard there calls for an analysis of the EU’s new strategy and its implications for Ukraine.
Sovereign Tech Europe 2026 was devoted entirely to the EU’s digital sovereignty and, more broadly, its technological sovereignty. The conference captured a fundamental shift in the rhetoric of European officials. The reports and discussions were built around several key ideas.
The speakers’ programmes make a strong impression until one remembers the scale of investment: tens of billions of euros in the EU versus hundreds of billions of dollars spent each year by the group of American technology giants. It is possible that the latest AI gold rush in America will lead to a market crash and a contraction of megaprojects – this has happened more than once before.
In that case, Europe has a chance to avoid being trapped in an investment race and instead build infrastructure based on pragmatic needs. There is, however, another view: that the world is now in an investment supercycle in which total investment in data centres and AI could reach $3 trillion by 2030.
The EU is trying to become an actor in digital geopolitics and enter into direct competition with US cloud providers. Yet it does not have competitive cloud technologies of its own at the necessary level, which is a major problem. To catch up with the United States, Brussels is betting on the development of its own Open Source-based platforms. This strategy gives plenty of food for thought.
The economics of consumerism is based on the desire to get the best product for a moderate price. This mindset of free markets – and Ukraine is no exception – creates a contradiction between business expectations and the goals of the state. Clouds are a clear example: more than 80% of the EU market is controlled by AWS, Microsoft and Google. Customers value their functionality more highly than European alternatives. The situation is made more difficult by the enormous investments of these three heavyweights: they lease the lion’s share of new data centres in the EU.
To counter Big Tech, Europe must act quickly. There is no time to evolve gradually to Microsoft’s level, which is why Open Source is the only realistic option.
The EU’s strategic task is to change the balance of power through aggressive protectionism and taxpayer-funded development.
The most audacious challenge facing EU leaders is the aggressive expansion of American AI projects. This phenomenon spans every layer: from energy-intensive data centres and vast volumes of computing power to direct work with user data.
In the light of Palantir’s manifesto, this balance of power looks like an undisguised threat. The idea of “national capitalism”, voiced by Alex Karp, effectively draws a line under decades of the liberal model of global markets.
This is about control over the digital dimension of our world. Europe does not want to lose that control.
For many years, the EU relied on strict regulation of American companies’ presence in the European market. I rather like the expression “paper civilisation”. Indeed, the EU’s regulatory framework could serve as a benchmark for any bureaucrat in the world. But the result was not what had been expected. Strict requirements for data protection and for the operation of different digital service providers hit Europe’s own companies. They turned out to have fewer resources for compliance than the hyperscalers.
These are the measures Europe is calling for.
Germany is taking the lead. It is methodically creating the infrastructure for a full transition to Open Source: a single development centre, support, training and dedicated funds.
There is a clear emerging demand for regional segmentation of digital markets. France is a good example. We shall see what comes of it.
The situation in Ukraine is similar to the European one, but with a domestic flavour. Historically, we have never had long strategies: our principle has been “take more, throw it further, and keep going until the next bend”. Yet demand for digital sovereignisation is growing. In this sense, Ukraine is Europe — only poorer, at war and corroded by corruption.
We are at a strategic fork in the road for our digital development in the near future.
The digital component is increasing its share and weight within Ukraine’s package of national capabilities and threats. Today, Ukraine is critically dependent on American software and hardware. The IT systems of our Defence Forces are largely funded by NATO countries, and the lion’s share of that money flows back to the technology giants: AWS, Microsoft, Google and Palantir. The government and the country are forced to manoeuvre between a shortage of funds and the risks of American services dominating the market – services, specifically, rather than technologies. Unfortunately, cooperation with the EU on digital autonomy is not even among the state’s top ten priorities.
Ukraine must fight for at least partial production of its own end-user services. Building our own services on top of American technologies is already better than simply consuming a ready-made product, giving away all added value and falling into complete dependence. We must create our own “digital factories” to ensure control over data inside the country.
If Ukraine and the EU continue to move in their chosen directions, then in a few years the two sides will understand each other less and less.
Incompatibility between technology stacks and legislation will make us foreign to one another. This is the crossroads: how do we find a balance between the United States and Europe? Unfortunately, the national WinWin 2030 strategy does not provide answers. Digital technologies are no longer simply business. AI – and not only AI – has made them an important part of geopolitics.
Without a clearly defined declaration of intent and a publicly stated strategy in the field of digital sovereignty, Ukraine will tread water. If we choose the path alongside the United States, we pay for their services and forget any illusions about our own uniqueness. If we are striving towards Europe, we must synchronise our policy with the EU’s direction of travel.
There is investment money in the country, and there is a willingness to invest it, but there is no basis for dialogue with the government. DSUA has already proposed the concept of a National Resilient Data Processing System. We are ready to act, but we are waiting for at least the slightest sign of movement from the state. Today, I do not feel especially enthusiastic about our future. I would very much like to be wrong.